Concepts of implementation

Japanese Economic Review

Volumn 47, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 133-143

  Thomson, William ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 8744257797     PISSN: 13524739     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00039.x     Document Type: Review

References (38)

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