The sum of the parts can violate the whole

American Political Science Review

Volumn 95, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 415-433

  Saari, Donald G ^a   Sieberg, Katri K ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b The College of William and Mary   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035533812     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0003055401002210     Document Type: Article

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