Global collective action

Global Collective Action

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 1-299

  Sandler, Todd ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84926182926     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511617119     Document Type: Book

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