Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes: I. Pairwise votes

Economic Theory

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 1-53

  Saari, Donald G ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Positional voting; Social choice; Voting paradoxes

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034407502     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001990050001     Document Type: Article

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