Chapter 43 Incomplete information

Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

Volumn 3, Issue , 2002, Pages 1665-1686

  Aumann, Robert J ^a,b,c,d   Heifetz, Aviad ^a,c,d  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^d CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

common priors; incomplete or differential information; interactive epistemology; semantic belief systems; syntactic belief systems

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649354441     PISSN: 15740005     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03006-0     Document Type: Review

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