A response to the critique of rational choice theory: Lakatos' and laudan's conceptions applied

Inquiry (United Kingdom)

Volumn 47, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 67-85

  Herne, Kaisa ^a   Setälä, Maija ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TURKU   (Finland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84994755579     PISSN: 0020174X     EISSN: 15023923     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00201740310004413     Document Type: Article

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