Voting Paradoxes and MCDM

Group Decision and Negotiation

Volumn 9, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 297-313

  Nurmi, Hannu ^a   Meskanen, Tommi ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TURKU   (Finland)

^b TURKU CENTRE FOR COMPUTER SCIENCE   (Finland)

Author keywords

Anscombe's paradox; Compound majority; Group decision making; Ostrogorski's paradox

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034386299     PISSN: 09262644     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1008618017659     Document Type: Article

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