Heuristics and biases: Insights from developmental studies

The Development of Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 122-149

  Morsanyi, Kinga ^a   Handley, Simon J ^b  

^a QUEEN S UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84904894346     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203068748     Document Type: Chapter

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