The influence of cognitive ability and instructional set on causal conditional inference

Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology

Volumn 63, Issue 5, 2010, Pages 892-909

  Evans, Jonathan St B T ^a   Handley, Simon J ^a   Neilens, Helen ^a   Over, David ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH   (United Kingdom)

^b DURHAM UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Belief bias; Conditional inference; Dual process theory

Indexed keywords

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE; ARTICLE; ATTENTION; COGNITION; CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY; EPIDEMIOLOGY; FEMALE; HUMAN; LEARNING; MALE; PHYSIOLOGY; PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY; REACTION TIME; SEMANTICS; STUDENT; THINKING; UNIVERSITY;

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE; ATTENTION; BIAS (EPIDEMIOLOGY); COGNITION; CULTURE; FEMALE; HUMANS; MALE; PROBABILITY LEARNING; PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY; REACTION TIME; SEMANTICS; STUDENTS; THINKING; UNIVERSITIES;

EID: 77951752366     PISSN: 17470218     EISSN: 17470226     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/17470210903111821     Document Type: Article

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