Developmental changes in probabilistic reasoning: The role of cognitive capacity, instructions, thinking styles, and relevant knowledge

Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 315-350

  Chiesi, Francesca ^a   Primi, Caterina ^a   Morsanyi, Kinga ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FLORENCE   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF GENEVA   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Cognitive development; Dual process theories; Heuristics and biases; Instruction manipulation; Probabilistic reasoning

Indexed keywords

EID: 79961228105     PISSN: 13546783     EISSN: 14640708     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2011.598401     Document Type: Article

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