When Less Is Not Always More: Stereotype Knowledge and Reasoning Development

Developmental Psychology

Volumn 47, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 432-441

  De Neys, Wim ^a,b   Vanderputte, Karolien ^c  

^a CNRS   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^c UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Decision making; Dual process theory; Heuristics; Reasoning

Indexed keywords

AGE; ARTICLE; ASSOCIATION; CHILD; CHILD DEVELOPMENT; CONFLICT; FEMALE; HUMAN; KNOWLEDGE; MALE; NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL TEST; PHYSIOLOGY; PRESCHOOL CHILD; PROBLEM SOLVING; SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY; THINKING;

AGE FACTORS; CHILD; CHILD DEVELOPMENT; CHILD, PRESCHOOL; CONFLICT (PSYCHOLOGY); CUES; FEMALE; HUMANS; KNOWLEDGE; MALE; NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS; PROBLEM SOLVING; STEREOTYPING; THINKING;

EID: 79952602018     PISSN: 00121649     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/a0021313     Document Type: Article

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