Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions

Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 518-536

  Buchfuhrer, Dave ^a   Dughmi, Shaddin ^b   Fu, Hu ^c   Kleinberg, Robert ^c   Mossel, Elchanan ^d   Papadimitriou, Christos ^e   Schapira, Michael ^f   Singer, Yaron ^e   Umans, Chris ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b Stanford University   (United States)

^c Cornell University ^*  (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^e UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^f Yale University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY; MACHINE DESIGN; MACHINERY;

ALGORITHMIC MECHANISM DESIGN; COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTIONS; COMPUTATIONALLY EFFICIENT; DETERMINISTIC MECHANISM; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE MECHANISMS; RANDOMIZED MECHANISM;

COMMERCE;

EID: 77951673980     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1137/1.9781611973075.45     Document Type: Conference Paper

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