A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms

Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Volumn 07-09-January-2007, Issue , 2007, Pages 1163-1170

  Christodoulou, George ^a   Koutsoupias, Elias ^b   Vidali, Angelina ^b  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INFORMATICS   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS   (Greece)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

MACHINE DESIGN;

APPROXIMATION RATIOS; LOWER BOUNDS; MECHANISM DESIGN; SCHEDULING MECHANISM; SCHEDULING TASKS; UNRELATED MACHINES;

SCHEDULING;

EID: 84969286315     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (18)

1. Nir Andelman, Yossi Azar, and Motti Sorani. Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines. In 22nd Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), pages 69-82, 2005.
2. Aaron Archer. Mechanisms for Discrete Optimization with Rational Agents. PhD thesis, Cornell University, January 2004.
3. Aaron Archer, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Kunal Talwar, and Éva Tardos. An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents. In Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), pages 205-214, 2003.
4. Aaron Archer and Éva Tardos. Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents. In 42nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pages 482-491, 2001.
5. Moshe Babaioff, Ron Lavi, and Elan Pavlov. Mechanism design for single-value domains. In Proceedings, The Twentieth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the Seventeenth Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference (AAAI), pages 241-247, 2005.
6. Yair Bartal, Rica Gonen, and Noam Nisan. Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the 9th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), pages 72-87, 2003.
7. Patrick Briest, Piotr Krysta, and Berthold Vöcking. Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design. In Proceedings of the 37th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pages 39-48, 2005.
8. Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, and Michael Schapira. Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders. In Proceedings of the 37th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pages 610-618, 2005.
9. Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, and Michael Schapira. Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the 38th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pages 644-652, 2006.
10. Hongwei Gui, Rudolf Müller, and Rakesh V. Vohra. Dominant strategy mechanisms with multidimensional types. In Computing and Markets, 2005.
11. D.S. Hochbaum. Approximation algorithms for NP-hard problems. PWS Publishing Co. Boston, MA, USA, 1996.
12. Roberts Kevin. The characterization of implementable choice rules. Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences, pages 321-348, 1979.
13. Annamaria Kovacs. Fast monotone 3-approximation algorithm for scheduling related machines. In Algorithms - ESA 2005: 13th Annual European Symposium, pages 616-627, 2005.
14. Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem, and Noam Nisan. Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions. In 44th Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pages 574-583, 2003.
15. J.K. Lenstra, D.B. Shmoys, and É. Tardos. Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines. Mathematical Programming, 46(1):259-271, 1990.
16. Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen. Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract). In Proceedings of the Thirty-First Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pages 129-140, 1999.
17. Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen. Algorithmic mechanism design. Games and Economic Behavior, 35:166-196, 2001.
18. Michael E. Saks and Lan Yu. Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains. In Proceedings 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), pages 286-293, 2005.