Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 656-

  Hart, Sergiu ^a   Nisan, Noam ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

auctions; revenue

Indexed keywords

AUCTIONS; DIRECT SUM; DISTRIBUTED ITEMS; MULTI-ITEM; MULTIPLE ITEMS; OPTIMAL AUCTION; REVENUE MAXIMIZATION; REVENUE OPTIMIZATION;

EARNINGS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; OPTIMIZATION;

SALES;

EID: 84863518005     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2229012.2229061     Document Type: Conference Paper

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