On the limits of black-box reductions in mechanism design

Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 435-447

  Chawla, Shuchi ^a   Immorlica, Nicole ^b   Lucier, Brendan ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c MSR New England   (United States)

Author keywords

algorithms; makespan; mechanism design; social welfare

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION RATIOS; AVERAGE-CASE; BLACK BOXES; BLACK-BOX REDUCTIONS; COMPUTATIONALLY EFFICIENT; EXPLICIT KNOWLEDGE; MAKESPAN; MECHANISM DESIGN; OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS; ORACLE ACCESS; PERFORMANCE GUARANTEES; PROBLEM CONSTRAINTS; SOCIAL WELFARE; TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS;

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATION THEORY; MACHINE DESIGN; SCHEDULING ALGORITHMS;

APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS;

EID: 84862588510     PISSN: 07378017     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2213977.2214019     Document Type: Conference Paper

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