An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations

Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 139-147

  Dobzinski, Shahar ^a  

^a Department of Computer Science and School of Operations Research and Information Engineering   (United States)

Author keywords

combinatorial auctions; incentive compatibility

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE; COMPUTATION THEORY; MACHINE DESIGN; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

ALGORITHMIC MECHANISM DESIGN; APPROXIMATION RATIOS; COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS; INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY; POLYNOMIAL-TIME; RANDOMIZED MECHANISM; TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS;

APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS;

EID: 79959747287     PISSN: 07378017     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1993636.1993656     Document Type: Conference Paper

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