Bayesian combinatorial auctions: Expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers

Proceedings - Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 512-521

  Alaei, Saeed ^a  

^a Institute of Advanced Computer Science   (United States)

Author keywords

Approximation; Bayesian Combinatorial Auction; Mechanism Design; Reduction

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION; BLACK BOXES; BUDGET CONSTRAINT; COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; IMPROVE-A; LINEARLY SEPARABLE; MECHANISM DESIGN; OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS; SUPPLY CONSTRAINTS;

COMMERCE; COMPUTER SCIENCE; MACHINE DESIGN; REDUCTION;

SALES;

EID: 84863330100     PISSN: 02725428     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/FOCS.2011.90     Document Type: Conference Paper

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