Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings

Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 734-747

  Hartline, Jason D ^a   Kleinberg, Robert ^b   Malekian, Azarakhsh ^a  

^a Northwestern University   (United States)

^b School of Operations Research and Information Engineering   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

ALGORITHM DESIGN; BAYESIAN; BAYESIAN INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITIES; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE MECHANISMS; MATCHINGS; MULTI DIMENSIONAL; POLYNOMIAL-TIME;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 79955735615     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1137/1.9781611973082.58     Document Type: Conference Paper

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