Pricing randomized allocations

Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 585-597

  Briest, Patrick ^a   Chawla, Shuchi ^c   Kleinberg, Robert ^b   Weinberg, S Matthew ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PADERBORN   (Germany)

^b Cornell University ^*  (United States)

^c University of Wisconsin   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COSTS; MACHINE DESIGN; MATHEMATICAL TRANSFORMATIONS; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS; SALES;

ALGEBRAIC TECHNIQUES; COMPUTATIONAL MECHANISM DESIGN; COMPUTATIONAL TRACTABILITY; INAPPROXIMABILITY; INDEPENDENT SAMPLES; POLYNOMIAL-TIME ALGORITHMS; RANDOMIZED MECHANISM; REVENUE MAXIMIZING;

ECONOMICS;

EID: 77951686246     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1137/1.9781611973075.49     Document Type: Conference Paper

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