Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy

Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 129-138

  Dobzinski, Shahar ^a   Fu, Hu ^a   Kleinberg, Robert D ^a  

^a School of Operations Research and Information Engineering   (United States)

Author keywords

combinatorial auctions; incentive compatibility

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE; COMPUTATION THEORY;

APPROXIMATION RATIOS; COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; CORRELATED DISTRIBUTIONS; DETERMINISTIC MECHANISM; INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY; RANDOMIZED MECHANISM; REVENUE MAXIMIZING; TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS;

POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

EID: 79959713646     PISSN: 07378017     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1993636.1993655     Document Type: Conference Paper

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