An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms

Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 459-478

  Cai, Yang ^a   Daskalakis, Constantinos ^a   Weinberg, S Matthew ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Border's theorem; multidimensional mechanisms; optimal mechanism design

Indexed keywords

ARBITRARY VALUES; BORDER'S THEOREM; CONSTRUCTIVE PROOF; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE MECHANISMS; MULTI-COMMODITY FLOW; MULTI-ITEM; MULTIPLE ITEMS; OPTIMAL MECHANISM; POLYNOMIAL-TIME ALGORITHMS; RUNNING TIME; TIME POLYNOMIALS;

ALGORITHMS; CHARACTERIZATION; COMMERCE; MACHINE DESIGN; POLYNOMIALS; STRUCTURAL OPTIMIZATION;

COMPUTATION THEORY;

EID: 84862635951     PISSN: 07378017     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2213977.2214021     Document Type: Conference Paper

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