Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design

Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 301-310

  Hartline, Jason D ^a   Lucier, Brendan ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

algorithms; Bayesian incentive compatibility; mechanism design; social welfare.

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMIC MECHANISM DESIGN; APPROXIMATION FACTOR; BAYES-NASH EQUILIBRIUM; BAYESIAN; BAYESIAN INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITIES; BLACK-BOX REDUCTIONS; INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE MECHANISMS; MECHANISM DESIGN; SINGLE-PARAMETER AGENTS; SOCIAL WELFARE; TRUTH-TELLING;

BAYESIAN NETWORKS; COMPUTATION THEORY; MACHINE DESIGN;

APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS;

EID: 77954691037     PISSN: 07378017     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1806689.1806732     Document Type: Conference Paper

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