On the hardness of being truthful

Proceedings - Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 250-259

  Papadimitriou, Christos ^a   Schapira, Michael ^b   Singer, Yaron ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY; COMPUTERS; DESIGN; FIBER OPTIC CHEMICAL SENSORS; HARDNESS;

APPROXIMABILITY; CENTRAL PROBLEMS; COMPLEXITY MODELS; COMPLEXITY RESULTS; COMPLEXITY THEORIES; COMPUTATIONAL MECHANISM DESIGNS; CONNECTING MECHANISMS; HARDNESS RESULTS; IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS; INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITIES; MECHANISM DESIGNS; NETWORK DESIGNS;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 57949083485     PISSN: 02725428     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/FOCS.2008.54     Document Type: Conference Paper

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