Learning Conditional Information

Mind and Language

Volumn 27, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 239-263

  Douven, Igor ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861786415     PISSN: 02681064     EISSN: 14680017     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2012.01443.x     Document Type: Article

References (65)

1. Barwise, J. 1986: Conditionals and conditional information. In E. C. Traugott, C. A. Ferguson and J. S. Reilly (eds), On Conditionals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 21-54.
2. Bennett, J. 2003: A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
3. Bhatt, R. and Pancheva, R. 2006: Conditionals. In M. Everaert and H. van Riemsdijk (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Syntax, vol. I. Oxford: Blackwell, 638-87.
4. Boutilier, C. and Goldszmidt, M. 1995: On the revision of conditional belief sets. In G. Crocco, L. Fariñas del Cerro and A. Herzig (eds), Conditionals. From Philosophy to Computer Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 267-300.
5. Bradley, R. 2005: Radical probabilism and Bayesian conditioning. Philosophy of Science, 72, 342-64.
6. Brem, S. and Rips, L. J. 2000: Explanation and evidence in informal argument. Cognitive Science, 24, 573-604.
7. Burge, T. 1993: Content preservation. Philosophical Review, 102, 457-88.
8. Burge, T. 1997: Interlocution, perception, and memory. Philosophical Studies, 86, 21-47.
9. Burgess, J. P. 2004: Review of J. Bennett, A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 10, 565-70.
10. Collins, J., Hall, E. and Paul, L. (eds) 2004: Causation and Counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
11. Dietz, R. and Douven, I. 2010: Ramsey's test, Adams' thesis, and left-nested conditionals. Review of Symbolic Logic, 3, 467-84.
12. Douven, I. 2002: Testing inference to the best explanation. Synthese, 130, 355-77.
13. Douven, I. 2005: A principled solution to Fitch's paradox. Erkenntnis, 62, 47-69.
14. Douven, I. 2008: The evidential support theory of conditionals. Synthese, 164, 19-44.
15. Douven, I. 2011: Abduction. In E. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011). Available at:
16. Douven, I. 2011: Indicative conditionals. In L. Horsten and R. Pettigrew (eds), A Companion to Philosophical Logic. London: Continuum Press, 383-405.
17. Douven, I. and Dietz, R. 2011: A puzzle about Stalnaker's hypothesis. Topoi, 31-7.
18. Douven, I. and Romeijn, J. W. 2011: A new resolution of the Judy Benjamin problem. Mind, 120, 637-70.
19. Douven, I. and Verbrugge, S. 2010: The Adams family. Cognition, 117, 302-18.
20. Earman, J. 1992: Bayes or Bust? Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
21. Edgington, D. 1995: On conditionals. Mind, 104, 235-329.
22. Edgington, D. 2003: What if? Questions about conditionals. Mind & Language, 18, 380-401.
23. Evans, J. St. B. T. 2007: Hypothetical Thinking: Dual Processes in Reasoning and Judgement. Hove: Psychology Press.
24. Evans, J. St. B. T., Handley, S. J. and Over, D. E. 2003: Conditionals and conditional probability. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 29, 321-55.
25. Evans, J. St. B. T. and Over, D. E. 2004: If. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
26. Foley, R. 1992: The epistemology of belief and the epistemology of degrees of belief. American Philosophical Quarterly, 29, 111-24.
27. Fricker, E. 1987: The epistemology of testimony. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (suppl. vol.), 61, 57-83.
28. Fricker, E. 1995: Telling and trusting: reductionism and anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony. Mind, 104, 393-411.
29. Fricker, E. 2006: Testimony and epistemic autonomy. In J. Lackey and E. Sosa (eds), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 225-50.
30. Garber, D. 1983: Old evidence and logical omniscience in Bayesian confirmation theory. In J. Earman (ed.), Testing Scientific Theories, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 99-131.
31. Gillies, D. 2000: Philosophical Theories of Probability. London: Routledge.
32. Hadjichristidis, C., Stevenson, R. J., Over, D. E., Sloman, S. A., Evans, J. St. B. T. and Feeney, A. 2001: On the evaluation of 'if p then q' conditionals. In J. D. Moore and K. Stenning (eds), Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. Edinburgh, 381-86.
33. Hintikka, J. 1968: The varieties of information and scientific explanation. In B. van Rootselaar and J. F. Staal (eds), Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science III. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 151-71.
34. Jackson, F. 1979: On assertion and indicative conditionals. Philosophical Review, 88, 565-89.
35. Johnson-Laird, P. N. 1983: Mental Models: Towards a Cognitive Science of Language, Inference, and Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
36. Joyce, J. M. 1999: The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
37. Kern-Isberner, G. 1999: Postulates for conditional belief revision. In T. Dean (ed.), Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann, 186-91.
38. Kern-Isberner, G. 2001: Conditionals in Nonmonotonic Reasoning and Belief Revision. Berlin: Springer.
39. Koehler, D. J. 1991: Explanation, imagination, and confidence in judgment. Psychological Bulletin, 110, 499-519.
40. Koslowski, B., Marasia, J., Chelenza, M. and Dublin, R. 2008: Information becomes evidence when an explanation can incorporate it into a causal framework. Cognitive Development, 23, 472-87.
41. Lewis, D. K. 1973a: Causation. Journal of Philosophy, 70, 556-67.
42. Lewis, D. K. 1973b: Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell.
43. Lewis, D. K. 1976: Probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities. Philosophical Review, 85, 297-315.
44. Lewis, D. K. 1986: Causal explanation. In his Philosophical Papers, Vol. II. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 214-40.
45. Lipton, P. 2004: Inference to the Best Explanation, 2nd edn. London: Routledge.
46. Lombrozo, T. 2007: Simplicity and probability in causal explanation. Cognitive Psychology, 55, 232-57.
47. McGrew, T. 2003: Confirmation, heuristics, and explanatory reasoning. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 54, 553-67.
48. Oaksford, M. and Chater, N. 2003: Conditional probability and the cognitive science of conditional reasoning. Mind & Language, 18, 359-79.
49. Oaksford, M. and Chater, N. 2007: Bayesian Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
50. Oberauer, K. and Wilhelm, O. 2003: The meaning(s) of conditionals: conditional probabilities, mental models and personal utilities. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition, 29, 688-93.
51. Okasha, S. 2000: Van Fraassen's critique of inference to the best explanation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 31, 691-710.
52. Over, D. E. and Evans, J. St. B. T. 2003: The probability of conditionals: the psychological evidence. Mind & Language, 18, 340-58.
53. Over, D. E., Evans, J. St. B. T. and Elqayam, S. 2010: Conditionals and non-constructive Reasoning. In M. Oaksford and N. Chater (eds), Cognition and Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 135-51.
54. Over, D. E., Hadjichristidis, C., Evans, J. St. B. T., Handley, S. J. and Sloman, S. A. 2007: The probability of causal conditionals. Cognitive Psychology, 54, 62-97.
55. Pfeifer, N. and Kleiter, G. D. 2010: The conditional in mental probability logic. In M. Oaksford and N. Chater (eds), Cognition and Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 153-73.
56. Politzer, G., Over, D. E. and Baratgin, J. 2010: Betting on conditionals. Thinking and Reasoning, 16, 172-97.
57. Popper, K. R. and Miller, D. 1983: A proof of the impossibility of inductive probability. Nature, 302, 687-88.
58. Rieger, A. 2006: A simple theory of conditionals. Analysis, 66, 233-40.
59. Skyrms, B. 1980: Causal Necessity. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
60. Stalnaker, R. C. 1968: A theory of conditionals. In N. Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, 98-112.
61. Stalnaker, R. C. 1984: Inquiry. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
62. van Fraassen, B. C. 1981: A problem for relative information minimizers in probability kinematics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 32, 375-79.
63. van Fraassen, B. C. 1988: The problem of old evidence. In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Dordrecht: Reidel, 153-65.
64. Weidenfeld, A., Oberauer, K. and Horning, R. 2005: Causal and non-causal conditionals: an integrated model of interpretation and reasoning. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58, 1479-513.
65. Weisberg, J. 2009: Locating IBE in the Bayesian framework. Synthese, 167, 125-43.