Dual systems and dual processes but a single function

The Science of Reason: A Festschrift for Jonathan St B.T. Evans

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 339-351

  Oaksford, Mike ^a   Chater, Nick ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 84858590681     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

References (24)

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