Belief change as propositional update

Cognitive Science

Volumn 21, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 419-460

  Elio, Renée ^a   Pelletier, Francis Jeffry ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA   (Canada)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031258875     PISSN: 03640213     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1207/s15516709cog2104_2     Document Type: Article

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