A Bayesian approach to the argument from ignorance

Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology

Volumn 58, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 75-85

  Oaksford, Mike ^a   Hahn, Ulrike ^a  

^a CARDIFF UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 2942633562     PISSN: 11961961     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/h0085798     Document Type: Article

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