Why are we convinced by the ad hominem argument?: Bayesian source reliability and pragma-dialectical discussion rules

Bayesian Argumentation: The Practical Side of Probability

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 39-58

  Oaksford, Mike ^a   Hahn, Ulrike ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b CARDIFF UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85031417612     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-5357-0_3     Document Type: Chapter

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