Logic and human reasoning: An assessment of the deduction paradigm

Psychological Bulletin

Volumn 128, Issue 6, 2002, Pages 978-996

  Evans, Jonathan St B T ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; COGNITION; EVALUATION; HUMAN; LOGIC; PROBLEM SOLVING;

COGNITION; HUMANS; LOGIC; PROBLEM SOLVING;

EID: 85047668925     PISSN: 00332909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/0033-2909.128.6.978     Document Type: Article

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