The impact of stock-option compensation for outside directors on firm value

Journal of Business

Volumn 78, Issue 6, 2005, Pages 2229-2254

  Fich, Eliezer M ^a   Shivdasani, Anil ^b  

^a DREXEL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 32144453308     PISSN: 00219398     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/497048     Document Type: Article

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