Compensation benchmarking, leapfrogs, and the surge in executive pay

American Journal of Sociology

Volumn 115, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 1671-1712

  DiPrete, Thomas A ^a   Eirich, Gregory M ^a   Pittinsky, Matthew ^b  

^a Howard Hughes Medical Institute   (United States)

^b ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77951204135     PISSN: 00029602     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/652297     Document Type: Article

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