Evolution of fairness in the one-shot anonymous Ultimatum Game

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

Volumn 110, Issue 7, 2013, Pages 2581-2586

  Rand, David G ^a,d   Tarnita, Corina E ^a,b,e   Ohtsuki, Hisashi ^f,g   Nowak, Martin A ^a,c  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^e PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^f GRADUATE UNIVERSITY FOR ADVANCED STUDIES   (Japan)

^g JAPAN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGENCY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Prosociality; Stochastic dynamics

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BEHAVIOR; BEHAVIOR GENETICS; BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS; EVOLUTIONARY ADAPTATION; GAME; HUMAN; MUTATION; MUTATION RATE; NATURAL SELECTION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; STOCHASTIC MODEL;

BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; CHOICE BEHAVIOR; COMPUTER SIMULATION; GAME THEORY; GAMES, EXPERIMENTAL; HUMANS; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL VALUES;

EID: 84873703168     PISSN: 00278424     EISSN: 10916490     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1214167110     Document Type: Article

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