The neural basis of economic decision-making in the Ultimatum Game

Science

Volumn 300, Issue 5626, 2003, Pages 1755-1758

  Sanfey, Alan G ^a   Rilling, James K ^a   Aronson, Jessica A ^a   Nystrom, Leigh E ^a   Cohen, Jonathan D ^a,b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH SCHOOL OF MEDICINE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH; BRAIN; CELLS; COGNITIVE SYSTEMS; DECISION MAKING; ECONOMICS; MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING;

EMOTIONAL PROCESSES;

NEUROLOGY;

BIOLOGY; BRAIN; DECISION MAKING;

ADULT; ARTICLE; BEHAVIOR; BRAIN; COGNITION; CONTROLLED STUDY; DECISION MAKING; ECONOMIC ASPECT; EMOTION; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; INSULA; NEUROECONOMICS; NORMAL HUMAN; NUCLEAR MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING; PREFRONTAL CORTEX; PRIORITY JOURNAL;

ADULT; BEHAVIOR; BRAIN; CEREBRAL CORTEX; COGNITION; DECISION MAKING; ECONOMICS; EMOTIONS; FEMALE; GAME THEORY; GAMES, EXPERIMENTAL; GYRUS CINGULI; HUMANS; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING; MALE; PREFRONTAL CORTEX;

EID: 0038179332     PISSN: 00368075     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1126/science.1082976     Document Type: Article

References (36)

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36. We would like to thank D. Kahneman, A. Scheres, and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. This work was supported in part by grants from the Seaver Institute and the Mind, Brain, Body, and Health Initiative.