Freedom, enforcement, and the social dilemma of strong altruism

Journal of Evolutionary Economics

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 203-217

  de Silva, Hannelore ^a   Hauert, Christoph ^b,c   Traulsen, Arne ^d   Sigmund, Karl ^e,f  

^a VIENNA UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Austria)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^c HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY   (Germany)

^e UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^f INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS   (Austria)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Costly punishment; Evolutionary game theory; Public goods games; Social dilemma; Strong altruism; Voluntary interactions

Indexed keywords

EID: 77951766874     PISSN: 09369937     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00191-009-0162-8     Document Type: Article

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