Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with multiple strategies

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 258, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 614-622

  Antal, Tibor ^a,b   Traulsen, Arne ^c   Ohtsuki, Hisashi ^d,e   Tarnita, Corina E ^a,b   Nowak, Martin A ^a,b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY   (Germany)

^d TOKYO INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Japan)

^e JAPAN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGENCY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Evolutionary game theory; Finite populations; Stochastic effects

Indexed keywords

EQUILIBRIUM; EVOLUTIONARY THEORY; GAME THEORY; MUTATION; SELECTION; STOCHASTICITY;

ARTICLE; EVOLUTION; GAME; GENETIC SELECTION; MUTATION RATE; POPULATION DYNAMICS; PRIORITY JOURNAL; STOCHASTIC MODEL; SYSTEMS THEORY;

ANIMALS; COMPUTER SIMULATION; GAME THEORY; MODELS, GENETIC; MUTATION; POPULATION DYNAMICS; SELECTION (GENETICS); STOCHASTIC PROCESSES;

EID: 67349230821     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.02.010     Document Type: Article

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