Enforcing Compliance with Environmental Agreements in the Absence of Strong Institutions: An Experimental Analysis

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 54, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 63-77

  Cherry, Todd L ^a,b   McEvoy, David M ^a  

^a APPALACHIAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH OSLO CICERO   (Norway)

Author keywords

Deposit refund; Enforcing compliance; Environmental agreements; Experimental economics; International environmental agreements

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS; POLLUTION CONTROL; REGULATORY COMPLIANCE;

ENFORCING COMPLIANCE; EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS; EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS; INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS; LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS; PUBLIC GOODS; VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS;

DEPOSITS;

COMPLIANCE; DECISION MAKING; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; EXPERIMENTAL STUDY; PARTICIPATORY APPROACH;

EID: 84872821257     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-012-9581-3     Document Type: Article

References (48)

1. Bagnoli M, McKee M (1991) Voluntary Contributions Games: Efficient Private Provision of Public Goods. Econ Inquiry 29(2): 351-366.
2. Barrett S (1994) Self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Oxf Econ Pap 46(1): 878-894.
3. Barrett S (1997) The strategy of trade sanctions in international environmental agreements. Resour Energy Econ 19(1): 345-361.
4. Barrett S (2003) Environment and statecraft: the strategy of environmental treaty-making. Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York.
5. Barrett S (2008) Climate treaties and the imperative of enforcement. Oxf Rev Econ Policy 24(2): 239-258.
6. Barrett S, Stavins R (2003) Increasing participation and compliance in international climate Change agreements. Int Environ Agreem Polit Law Econ 3: 349-376.
7. Breton M, Sbragia L, Zaccour G (2010) A dynamic model for international environmental agreements. Environ Resour Econ 45(1): 25-48.
8. Cadsby CB, Maynes E (1999) Voluntary provision of threshold public goods with continuous contributions: experimental evidence. J Pub Econ 71(1): 53-73.
9. Carraro C, Siniscalco D (1993) Strategies for the international protection of the environment. J Pub Econ 52(3): 309-328.
10. Carraro C, Siniscalco D (1998) International environmental agreements: incentives and political Economy. Eur Econ Rev 42(3-5): 561-572.
11. Carraro C, Marchiori C, Oreffice S (2009) Endogenous minimum participation in international environmental treaties. Environ Resour Econ 42(3): 411-425.
12. Cason TN, Plott CR (1996) EPA's new emissions trading mechanism: a laboratory evaluation. J Environ Econ Manag 30(2): 133-160.
13. Charness G, Rabin M (2002) Understanding social preferences with simple tests. Q J Econ 117(3): 817-869.
14. Chaudhuri A (2011) Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective Survey of the Literature. Exp Econ 14(1): 47-83.
15. Croson R, Marks M (2000) Step returns in threshold public goods: a meta- and experimental analysis. Exp Econ 2: 239-259.
16. Dannenberg A, Lange A, Sturm B (2010) On the formation of coalitions to provide public goods-experimental evidence from the lab. National bureau of economic research working paper no. 15967.
17. Dawes RM, Orbell JM, Simmons RT, Vande Kragt AJC (1986) Organizing groups for collective action. Am Polit Sci Rev 80(4): 1171-1185.
18. Energy Information Administration (1998) Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on United States energy markets and economic activity. Office of integrated analysis and forecasting, United States Department of Energy, Washington, DC.
19. Erev I, Rapoport A (1990) Provision of step-level public goods: the sequential contribution mechanism. J Confl Resolut 34(3): 401-425.
20. Finus M, Rundshagen B (1998) Toward a Positive Theory of Coalition Formation and Endogenous Instrument Choice in Global Pollution Control. Public Choice 96(1-2): 145-186.
21. Finus M (2008) The enforcement mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol: flawed or promising concepts. Lett Spatial Resour Sci 1(1): 13-25.
22. Fullerton D, Wu W (1998) Policies for green design. J Environ Econ Manag 36(2): 131-148.
23. Gerber A, Wichardt P (2009) Providing public goods in the absence of strong institutions. J Pub Econ 93 (3-4): 429-439.
24. Hoel M (1992) International environmental conventions: the case of uniform reductions of emissions. Environ Resour Econ 2(2): 141-159.
25. Hoel M, Schneider K (1997) Incentives to participate in an international environmental treaty. Environ Resour Econ 9(2): 153-170.
26. Hovi J, Froyn CB, Bang G (2007) Enforcing the Kyoto Protocol: can punitive consequences restore compliance?. Rev Int Stud 33(3): 435-449.
27. Isaac MR, Schmidtz D, Walker JM (1989) The assurance problem in a laboratory market. Pub Choice 62(3): 217-236.
28. Kolstad C (2007) Systematic uncertainty in self-enforcing international environmental agreements. J Environ Econ Manag 53(1): 68-79.
29. Kosfeld M, Okada A, Riedl A (2009) Institution formation in public goods games. Am Econ Rev 99(4): 1335-1355.
30. Ledyard J (1995) Public good: a survey of experimental results. In: Kagel J, Roth A (eds) The handbook of experimental economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 111-194.
31. Marks M, Croson R (1998) Alternative rebate rules in the provision of a threshold public good: an experimental investigation. J Pub Econ 67(2): 195-220.
32. Marks M, Croson R (1999) The Effect of incomplete information in a threshold public goods experiment. J Pub Econ 67(2): 195-220.
33. McEvoy D (2010) Not it: opting out of voluntary coalitions that provide a public good. Pub Choice 142(1-2): 9-23.
34. McEvoy D, Murphy JJ, Spraggon JM, Stranlund JK (2011) The problem of maintaining compliance with stable coalitions: experimental evidence. Oxf Econ Pap 63(3): 475-498.
35. McEvoy D, Stranlund J (2009) Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with costly monitoring for compliance. Environ Resour Econ 42: 491-508.
36. McGinty M (2007) International environmental agreements among asymmetric nations. Oxf Econ Pap 59(1): 45-62.
37. Plott C (1987) Dimensions of parallelism: some policy applications of experimental methods. In: Alvin Roth (ed) Laboratory experimentation in economics: six points of view. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
38. Rapoport A, Eshed-Levy D (1989) Provision of step-Level public goods: effects of greed and fear of being gypped. Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 44(3): 325-344.
39. Rapoport A, Suleiman R (1993) Incremental contribution in step-level public goods games with asymmetric players. Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 55(2): 171-194.
40. Rauchdobler J, Sausgruber R, Tyran J (2010) Voting on thresholds for public goods: experimental evidence. Pub Finance Anal 66(1): 34-64.
41. Rubio SJ, Ulph A (2006) Self-enforcing international environmental agreements revisited. Oxf Econ Pap 58(2): 233-263.
42. Rubio SJ, Ulph A (2007) An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements. J Environ Econ Manag 54(3): 296-310.
43. Shogren JF, Hurley TM (1999) Experiments in environmental economics. In: van den Bergh JCJM (eds) Handbook of environmental and resource economics. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
44. Stranlund JK, Murphy JJ, Spraggon JM (2011) An experimental analysis of compliance in dynamic emissions markets. J Environ Econ Manag 62(3): 414-429.
45. Suleiman R, Rapoport A (1992) Provision of step-level public goods with continuous contribution. J Behav Decis Mak 5(2): 133-153.
46. Tavoni A, Dannenberg A, Kallis G, Löschel A (2011) Inequality, communication and the avoidance of disastrous climate change in a public goods game. Proc Natl Acad Sci 108(29): 11825-11829.
47. Tourney D, Fujiwara N (2010) National commitments, compliance and the future of the Kyoto Protocol. Centre Eur Policy Stud 226: 1-228.
48. van de Kragt AJC, Orbell JM, Dawes RM (1983) The minimal contributing set as a solution to public goods problems. Am Polit Sci Rev 77(1): 112-122.