The problem of maintaining compliance within stable coalitions: Experimental evidence

Oxford Economic Papers

Volumn 63, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 475-498

  McEvoy, David M ^a   Murphy, James J ^b   Spraggon, John M ^c   Stranlund, John K ^c  

^a APPALACHIAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA ANCHORAGE   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COOPERATIVE SECTOR; FINANCIAL PROVISION; PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT; PUBLIC GOODS; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 79959570420     PISSN: 00307653     EISSN: 14643812     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oep/gpq023     Document Type: Article

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