Providing public goods in the absence of strong institutions

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 93, Issue 3-4, 2009, Pages 429-439

  Gerber, Anke ^a   Wichardt, Philipp C ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Climate change treaties; Cooperation; Institutions; Public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 61549110525     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.10.006     Document Type: Article

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