Not it: Opting out of voluntary coalitions that provide a public good

Public Choice

Volumn 142, Issue 1-2, 2010, Pages 9-23

  McEvoy, David M ^a  

^a APPALACHIAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Free riding; Public goods experiments; Voluntary agreements; Voluntary coalitions

Indexed keywords

EID: 77949773997     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9468-1     Document Type: Article

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