The enforcement mechanisms of the Kyoto protocol: Flawed or promising concepts?

Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences

Volumn 1, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 13-25

  Finus, Michael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Game theoretic analysis; Kyoto protocol; Monitoring; Non compliance procedures

Indexed keywords

EID: 49749149731     PISSN: 18644031     EISSN: 1864404X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s12076-008-0002-8     Document Type: Article

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