Endogenous minimum participation in international environmental treaties

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 42, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 411-425

  Carraro, Carlo ^a   Marchiori, Carmen ^b   Oreffice, Sonia ^c  

^a CA' FOSCARI UNIVERSITY OF VENICE   (Italy)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ALICANTE   (Spain)

Author keywords

Agreements; Climate; Negotiations; Participation rule; Policy

Indexed keywords

CONTRACTS; ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS; POLLUTION CONTROL; PUBLIC POLICY;

CLIMATE; COALITION FORMATION GAMES; ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES; INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS; INTERNATIONAL TREATIES; NEGOTIATIONS; NON-COOPERATIVE; PARTICIPATION RULE;

LAWS AND LEGISLATION;

COOPERATIVE SECTOR; ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT; ENVIRONMENTAL MODELING; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; PARTICIPATORY APPROACH;

EID: 62349142307     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-009-9264-x     Document Type: Article

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