A dynamic model for international environmental agreements

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 45, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 25-48

  Breton, Michèle ^a   Sbragia, Lucia ^b   Zaccour, Georges ^a  

^a HEC MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

^b DURHAM UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Dynamic game; Environment; International agreements; Non cooperative game; Replicator dynamics

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION; POLLUTION; POLLUTION CONTROL;

DYNAMIC GAME; ENVIRONMENT; ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE; INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS; NONCOOPERATIVE GAME; PARTIAL COOPERATION; POLLUTION EMISSIONS; REPLICATOR DYNAMICS;

ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS;

EMISSION INVENTORY; ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION; ENVIRONMENTAL MODELING; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; WELFARE ECONOMICS;

EID: 77949422967     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-009-9304-6     Document Type: Article

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