Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with costly monitoring for compliance

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 42, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 491-508

  McEvoy, David M ^a   Stranlund, John K ^b  

^a APPALACHIAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

Author keywords

Compliance; International environmental agreements; Monitoring; Self enforcing agreements

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS; INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION; POLLUTION CONTROL;

COMPLIANCE; COMPLIANCE PERFORMANCE; COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS; ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY; INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS;

MONITORING;

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS; ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT; ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING; ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 61449258438     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-008-9220-1     Document Type: Article

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