CEO compensation: A resource advantage and stakeholder-bargaining perspective

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 34, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 22-41

  Pandher, Gurupdesh ^a   Currie, Russell ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

CEO pay; corporate strategy; offshoring; resource perspective; stakeholders

Indexed keywords

CEO PAY; CORPORATE STRATEGIES; OFF-SHORING; RESOURCE PERSPECTIVE; STAKEHOLDERS;

MANAGEMENT; PLANNING;

INDUSTRY;

EID: 84870546015     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.1995     Document Type: Review

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