When Competitive Advantage Doesn't Lead to Performance: The Resource-Based View and Stakeholder Bargaining Power

Organization Science

Volumn 10, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 119-133

  Coff, Russell W ^a  

^a EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining Power; Knowledge Based Assets; Rent Appropriation; Resource Based View

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033414887     PISSN: 10477039     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/orsc.10.2.119     Document Type: Article

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