Brokers and competitive advantage

Management Science

Volumn 53, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 566-583

  Ryall, Michael D ^a   Sorenson, Olav ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

^c LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Biform games; Games group decisions; Networks graphs; Organizational studies; Social networks; Strategy

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; GRAPH THEORY; INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH; PROFITABILITY; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

BIFORM GAMES; GAMES-GROUP DECISIONS; ORGANIZATIONAL STUDIES; SOCIAL NETWORKS;

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT;

EID: 34247550104     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0675     Document Type: Article

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