Processing differences between descriptions and experience: A comparative analysis using eye-tracking and physiological measures

Frontiers in Psychology

Volumn 3, Issue JUN, 2012, Pages

  Glöckner, Andreas ^a   Fiedler, Susann ^a   Hochman, Guy ^b   Ayal, Shahar ^c   Hilbig, Benjamin E ^a,d  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON COLLECTIVE GOODS   (Germany)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c INTERDISCIPLINARY CENTER   (Israel)

^d UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

Description vs. experience gap; Evidence accumulation; Eye tracking; Prospect; Risky choices; Sampling

Indexed keywords

EID: 84862257031     PISSN: None     EISSN: 16641078     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00173     Document Type: Article

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