Decisions from experience and statistical probabilities: Why they trigger different choices than a priori probabilities

Journal of Behavioral Decision Making

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 48-68

  Hau, Robin ^a   Pleskac, Timothy J ^b   Hertwig, Ralph ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BASEL   (Switzerland)

^b MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Decisions; Experience; Information representation; Rare events; Risk and uncertainty; Risky choice; Sampling

Indexed keywords

EID: 72449179430     PISSN: 08943257     EISSN: 10990771     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/bdm.665     Document Type: Article

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