Of black swans and tossed coins: Is the description-experience gap in risky choice limited to rare events?

PLoS ONE

Volumn 6, Issue 6, 2011, Pages

  Ludvig, Elliot A ^a,b   Spetch, Marcia L ^c  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Princeton University   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ARTICLE; AVERSIVE BEHAVIOR; CONTROLLED STUDY; DECISION MAKING; EMOTIONALITY; FEEDBACK SYSTEM; FEMALE; HIGH RISK BEHAVIOR; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; LIFE EVENT; MALE; NORMAL HUMAN; PERSONAL EXPERIENCE; PROBABILITY; RISK ASSESSMENT; ADOLESCENT; AROUSAL; COGNITION; EMOTION; LEARNING; PHYSIOLOGY;

CYGNUS ATRATUS;

ADOLESCENT; ADULT; AROUSAL; CHOICE BEHAVIOR; COGNITION; EMOTIONS; FEEDBACK; HUMANS; LEARNING; LIFE CHANGE EVENTS; MALE; RISK-TAKING; YOUNG ADULT;

EID: 79957846560     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19326203     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0020262     Document Type: Article

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