Yes, they can! Appropriate weighting of small probabilities as a function of information acquisition

Acta Psychologica

Volumn 138, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 390-396

  Hilbig, Benjamin E ^a,b   Glöckner, Andreas ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

^b MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON COLLECTIVE GOODS   (Germany)

Author keywords

Automatic processes; Description experience gap; Probability weighting; Risky choice; Sampling

Indexed keywords

ADOLESCENT; ADULT; ARTICLE; CLINICAL TRIAL; COGNITION; CONTROLLED CLINICAL TRIAL; CONTROLLED STUDY; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; HIGH RISK BEHAVIOR; HUMAN; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; PHYSIOLOGY; PROBABILITY; RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIAL;

ADOLESCENT; ADULT; COGNITION; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; HUMANS; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; PROBABILITY; RISK-TAKING;

EID: 80755139766     PISSN: 00016918     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2011.09.005     Document Type: Article

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